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Abstract
Our study aims to examine whether market segmentation and com-
petition manifested in the proliferation of multilateral trading facil-
ities (MTFs) improve market quality after the implementation of
MiFID. To do this, we employ the Common Factor Weight and
Weighted Price Contributionmethods to study relative price discov-
ery for threemajorMTFs—LSE, BATS, andTurquoise, using intra-day,
five-minute transaction prices. The results suggest that the two trad-
ing venues, BATS andTurquoise, contributemore to impounding fun-
damental information, implying a shift in price dominance from tra-
ditional LSE toMTFs. In addition, the intra-day price contributions of
MTFs are higher than those of LSE, especially during the first and last
periods of the day. The estimated average daily price contributions
are consistent with this result.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Previously, when an investor bought shares in Sainsbury's, a UK-based food and clothing retail company, they had to
discover its price on the London Stock Exchange. In recent years, however, capital markets have changed dramatically
and with the implementation of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) in 2007—a European Law on
financial services for the 31 member states of the European Economic Area—Sainsbury's shares are now listed on a
pan-European basis, where an investor can access many prices over many alternative trading venues in addition to
LSE. The centrepiece of MiFID was to abolish the way that shares were only traded on their national exchange—and
this, in turn, paved the foundation for the growth of many multilateral trading facilities (MTFs).1 Ultimately, the goal
of MiFID is to encourage competition in share dealing in the European capital markets. Also, the emergence of MTFs
could effectively reduce trading fees, making the costs of Europe's capital markets more conformable to the US.
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TABLE 1 Market share of different trading systems in FTSE 100 stocks
Panel (a): Market Share of FTSE 100 Constituents Traded throughDifferent Facilitiesa
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
LIT 59.81% 55.15% 54.04% 38.71% 41.43% 46.50% 49.45% 47.68%
DARK 0.80% 2.07% 2.67% 2.48% 3.41% 4.82% 5.34% 5.99%
SI 2.68% 3.13% 3.38% 2.52% 1.65% 1.45% 1.44% 2.01%
OTC 36.71% 39.64% 39.91% 56.29% 53.50% 47.23% 43.77% 44.32%
Total: 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Panel (b): Order Book of FTSE 100 Traded Through LITb
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
LSE 41.20% 32.09% 29.47% 22.82% 24.30% 28.56% 29.51% 27.36%
CHI-X 11.57% 14.51% 15.59% 10.77% 9.93% 9.02% 3.62% 3.83%
BATS 2.95% 5.23% 4.79% 2.40% 2.45% 2.49% 9.74% 9.51%
TURQUOISE 3.47% 2.57% 3.98% 2.60% 4.71% 6.33% 6.58% 6.97%
Panel (c): Size and Volume of Trade for FTSE 100 LITOrder Bookc
Year Average Size (£) Number of Trades (Million) Volume of Trade (Billion £)
2009 2344 102 240
2010 2302 91 211
2011 1865 97 182
2012 1718 91 156
2013 1566 85 133
2014 1359 105 143
2015 1527 128 159
2016 1593 145 172
Source: Fidessa Fragulator
aNotes: 1. FTSE shares are traded through LIT and OTCs each year. In contrast, the same trading via dark pools and SIs is
at a small scale. 2. Trading through dark pools increases steadily through time (although it accounts for a small scale in the
entire FTSE 100 shares trading). Nearly 50% European equities is settled in dark pools instead of open markets from 2008
to 2010, even when these orders could use the facilities of RMs, MTFs or OTCs (CFA 2011). This could be due to the pro-
liferation of MTFs during these years, as when MTFs are exempted from pre-trade transparency via waiver, MTFs will be a
Dark Pool.
bNotes: 1. Panel (b) shows how trading in FTSE 100 shares through LIT spreads among the four exchanges. 2. LSE, which used
to be the largest MTF for this type of trading, now gradually gives its dominance to other co-locations, especially Chi-X (from
2009 to 2014), and BATS (in 2015, 2016).
cNotes: 1. The trading of FTSE 100 shares through LSE LITs declines as the average order size declines considerably during
MiFID's post-launch period. This coincides with CESR's (2009) report and also verifies our findings in Panel (b): LSE used to be
the largest MTF for this type of trading, and now gradually gives its dominance to other co-locations. 2. The trading volume of
FTSE 100 though LSE LIT has declined dramatically throughout the years ofMiFID, which could be a consequence of growth in
OTCs and dark pools trading revealed in Table 1, Panel (a).
TheUK equitymarket saw a proliferation inMTFs since the beginning ofMiFID in 2007. Not surprisingly, the quasi-
monopoly position led by the London Stock Exchange diminished as various exchanges started to serve as the venues
to trade FTSE 100 constituents. These co-trading houses that form the recording of 100% order book of FTSE 100
constituents include: Chi-X (from late 2007); and Turquoise and BATS (from late 2008).2 Table 1, Panel (b) takes the
order book of FTSE 100 traded through LIT as an example of how trading activities spread among the four exchanges.3
Clearly, LSE, which used to be the largest MTF for such a type of trading, gradually lost its dominance to other co-
locations, especially Chi-X and BATS (in 2015, 2016). It is open to question whether market segmentation and compe-
titionmanifested in the proliferation ofMTFs can improvemarket quality. Indeed, academic literature for the evidence
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of whether a fragmented market enhances market quality is twofold. Many studies are in favour of consolidation—
they hold the belief that concentration of liquidity can increase the chance of order execution, reduce trading costs
and therefore, attract more liquidity.4 Therefore, the direct consequence of MiFID, i.e. a propagation of MTFs, could
typically have a negative impact on market liquidity and market quality. For example, Pagano (1989) argues that the
trading equilibriumunder a two-market system is naturally unstable as traders tend to spontaneouslymove to themar-
ket with greater liquidity. Madhavan (1995) suggests that as the level of fragmentation increases, price volatility also
increases. Chowdhry andNanda (1991) find that under a fragmented financialmarket, informed traders can selectively
execute orders based on their privileged information, which creates the “cream skimming” effect which is harmful for
market quality, and the adverse selection costs raised from asymmetric information are in line with the level of market
fragmentation.
It is interesting to note, however, that there is a large number of literature which supports the view that fragmen-
tation improves market quality.5 In particular, Economides (1996) argues that the benefits from network externalities
under consolidationmay not offset the losses occurred frommonopolymarketmakers, whereas competition and frag-
mentation tend to reduce trading costs and improvemarket efficiency. Hendershott andMendelson (2000) argue that
fragmentation and crossing networksmay benefit traders with reduced adverse selection risks and low costs of inven-
tory holdings.
Given that researchers have long sought to explain the quality of a fragmented market, and that they have done
so with varying degrees of success, it is interesting to examine how fragmented the UK equity market remains after
MiFID and whether such a multi-market system contributes greatly to the improvement of market quality. Table 1,
Panel (a) shows the market share of different types of trading facilities for FTSE 100 constituents, from 2009 to 2016,
when MiFID was implemented. More than 90% of trading in FTSE 100 constituents is settled through LIT order book
and OTCs (over-the-counters) each year. In contrast, the same trading through dark pools and SIs (System Internal-
izers) is at a small scale. Despite LIT and OTCs still forming the primary means of trading in FTSE 100 constituents,
however, we notice that the trading increases continuously through dark pools (from 0.8% in 2009 to 5.99% in 2016)
while decreasing through SIs. One may argue that the dark pools trading accounts lightly for the entire FTSE 100
constituents, according to Fidessa's data. However, such growth is worth noticing because: (1) nearly 50% of the Euro-
pean equities is settled in dark pools instead of open markets from 2008 to 2010, even when these orders could use
the facilities of RMs (RegulatedMarkets),MTFs orOTCs (CFA2011); (2)MTFsmay be exempted frompre-trade trans-
parency via waiver, and such a case, MTFs will be a dark pool. The proliferation of MTFs may contribute to the growth
of dark pools.
To look further, we report the average order size, number of trades and total trading volume of FTSE 100 shares
through LSE LITs (see Table 1, Panel c). There is a decreasing trend in the average order size duringMiFID's post-launch
period. This coincides with the CESR (2009) report, which suggests that the size of trade for FTSE 100 LIT order book
started to drift downwards, both before and after MiFID. This also verifies our general observations at the beginning
of the paper (see Table 1, Panel b). This could be the result of several observed factors, including proliferation of algo-
rithmic trading, fragmentation of themarket andmarket volatility.6 A similar declining trend in the size of trade can be
found in dark pools, SI andOTC order books (see Figure 1).
In general, there is a declining trend in the average size of the order books settled through these trading vehicles.
The evidence of the commonality of falling trends in sizes and volumes across different trading facilities leads us to
believe in the rise of MTFs. In particular, in high frequency trading, those new trading venues focus greatly on devel-
oping through technology innovations to reduce trading latency and trading costs in the competition against conven-
tional primary markets. These are of great importance: on one hand, it could cause traders to migrate from primary
markets to MTFs and new trading houses, and eventually alter the price discovery relation across trading venues;
on the other hand, with the migration and emergence of a new type of trading, the market complexity and struc-
ture may be greatly affected and even changed—particularly with more unknown factors, like trading dynamics and
so on, in the dark pool. It is clear that either impact would be highly relevant for traders in their daily activities and
profitability.
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F IGURE 1 Average sizes of dark pools, SI andOTC order books
Source: BATS Chi-X Europe.
Notes: 1. In general, the average sizes of dark pools, SI and OTC order books decline through time. 2. The period of the
sample relevant to the average size of SI order books is limited to 2014 due to data restrictions.
1.1 The competitive pressure facing traditional regulatedmarkets
Traditional RMs are facing tremendous competition and pressure fromMTFs underMiFID because either those inno-
vative ways of trading provided by MTFs are unavailable from RMs, or the scope, depth and diversity of trading that
MTFs manage to handle are not achievable by RMs. Typical reasons include: 1) though there are some MTFs solely
focusing on domestic markets like most RMs,7 the majority of MTFs offer pan-European trading under the provi-
sion of the MiFID passport rule; 2) MTFs put heavy investments into fast information technology in order to attract
order flows through algorithmic trading and statistical arbitrage; 3) mostMTFs operate in dark pools in order to lower
transaction costs and 4) MTFs usually operate a Smart Order Routing System (SORS) that optimizes order execution
by navigating the orders out of traffic jam in one particular market queue to other possible external trading plat-
forms. Some complicated SORS can also decide to split block orders smartly in order to achieve the most effective
execution.
Lately, RMs have started to upgrade their trading platforms in order to increase trading speed and reduce trans-
action fees.8 They also offer “sponsored access” that allows clients to have direct technical connection to regulated
markets’ order books with restriction, so that the trading latency can be reduced. Further, most RMs have also estab-
lished their ownMTFs, such as dark pools, not only to diversify and expand their revenue sources, but also to compete
with themainMTFs. One example is Turquoise (owned by London Stock Exchanges), which now has become one of the
largestMTFs in Europe.
1.2 Our proposed study
Our study aims to explore whether market segmentation and competition manifested in the rise of MTFs can improve
marketquality—inparticular, thepricediscoveryprocess,which is an important indicator ofmarketquality that reflects
timely dissemination and incorporation of information into market prices. Recent academic literature focuses on the
informational role of MTFs in the financial market. For example, Aitken, Harris, and Sensenbrenner (2010, 2012),
Gentile and Fioravanti (2011) and Riordan, Storkenmaier, and Wagener (2011) find evidence that supports the view
thatMTFs facilitatepricediscovery, andMTFshave since takenover the roleof pricediscovery fromtraditional primary
market. Conversely, Spankowski et al. (2012) argue thatMTFs do not facilitate price discovery, and that they free-ride
on the information emanating from theprimarymarket. The uniqueness of this paper is the use of intra-day five-minute
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transaction prices of selected company's shares groupedunder threemajorMTFs (LSE, BATS, andTurquoise), aswell as
Huang's (2002) price-weighted contribution measure as a validation to the common factor weight method commonly
employed in this type of study.
In the paper, we first employ Gonzalo and Granger's (1995) common factor weight method to examine price dis-
covery. In particular, we investigate which of those trading venues contribute more to impounding fundamental infor-
mation, and how price leadership shifts among trading venues under certain competitive environments under MiFID.
Price leadership refers to the abilitywhere one trading venue adjusts trading prices on arriving information aheadof its
competitors. We focus on ten FTSE 100 constituents9 that are also actively traded on MTFs. The results suggest that
trading venues are facing more intense competition than ever, and leadership in price discovery shifts from traditional
LSE toMTFs, including BATS and Turquoise.We then apply Huang's (2002) weighted price contributionmetric to esti-
mate intra-day price contribution of the sameassets. The results suggest that intra-day price contributions ofMTFs are
higher than those of LSE—especially during the first and last periods of the day. The estimated average daily price con-
tributions are consistentwith this result. The remainder of thepaper is organized as follows: Section2 critically reviews
the existing literature, Section 3 discusses the research methodology and hypotheses formation, Section 4 describes
the empirical data for this paper, Section 5 presents the estimated results and findings, and Section 6 concludes
with this study.
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Is market fragmentation beneficial for the improvement ofmarket quality?
This literature reviewreveals twocompeting viewsabout this topic. The first viewholds that the trading costs are lower
in concentratedmarketswhen compared to fragmented ones, as it is easier to find trading parties in the former—which
can create network externality, and the benefit of externality itself can bring in more liquidity to concentrated mar-
kets (see, for example, Pagano, 1989; Chowdhry &Nanda, 1991). Hence, the larger themarket, themore investors will
move in for greater opportunities of trade execution, which implies that liquidity begets liquidity and further improves
price discovery. Mendelson (1987) examined market performance under four different exchange models—the consol-
idated, fragmented, monopoly and interdealer—and concludes that fragmentation may harm the quality of a market.
Madhavan (1995), however, focused on the mechanism for information disclosure and finds that fragmentation may
be beneficial for large traders who placemultiple orders due to the lack of necessary information disclosure. But when
trade information disclosure is not mandatory, liquidity will not necessarily be consolidated. The study also points out
that high price volatility in conjunction with low price efficiency are possible in a fragmentedmarket. Bennett andWei
(2006) also supported the view that fragmentation has a negative impact on liquidity and market efficiency, and order
flow consolidation is crucial especially for equities with less liquidity. Gajewski and Gresse (2007) compared the trad-
ing costs on the hybrid order book of London Stock Exchange and the centralised order book of Euronext. The study
suggested that price volatility was significantly higher in the hybrid order book and the transaction costs are lower in
the centralised order book. In addition, the dealers outside the centralised order book are faced with higher execution
and inventory costs, combined with higher adverse selection risks. The Securities and Exchange Commission (2001)
reported the effective spread on theNYSE is lower than that of NASDAQ for a sample ofmatched stocks, whereNYSE
is a more consolidated market and NASDAQ has high level of fragmentation. Bennett and Wei (2006) also studied
movement of order flows from NASDAQ to NYSE, where the overall execution costs were found to be lower in the
more consolidatedmarket.
While there is documented evidence supporting the view that consolidation is beneficial for the quality of a mar-
ket, many other studies argued, however, that a fragmented market is much better for market quality. Economides
(1996) focused on the network externalities and argued that although network externality may bring in more liquidity
to a concentrated market, it cannot off-set the welfare losses under a market with monopoly providers. Harris (1993)
also pointed out that although liquidity can attract liquidity, different traders require different market mechanisms to
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satisfy various trading needs, which can result in a fragmented market. Hendershott andMendelson (2000) examined
the dealer markets and alternative trading crossing networks in their study, and suggested that market participants
who use crossing networks to execute orders can indeed benefit from fragmentation with reduced adverse selection
risk10 and lower costs of inventory holdings. Battalio (1997) studied the bid-ask spread for stocks listed on the NYSE
and found that the quote-based spread narrowed after the introduction of a major third market dealer (Madoff Secu-
rities), and the trading costs did not increase. The study also indicated that the adverse selection risk associated with
fragmentationwas lower. In addition, themarket efficiency improves evenwith the possible presence of adverse selec-
tion risk.
BoehmerandBoehmer (2003) found significant liquidity improvement after theentryofNYSE intoAMEX listedETF
trading. The quoted, effective and realised spreads decreased significantly after the entry, and the quote-based depth
documented high level of increase, which lay between 68% and 69%. Foucault andMenkveld (2008) tested the effects
of fragmentation after the entry of EuroSETS into the Dutch equity market, where trade previously took place in the
centralised market NSC. Their findings suggested that due to increased competition between the incumbent and new
entrant markets, there was a reduction in the trading costs, the market depth for both markets saw an improvement,
and the overall market quality became better. O'Hara and Ye (2011) compared the market quality at different levels
of fragmentation in the U.S markets. They took trade reporting facilities (TRF) volume as a measure for the level of
fragmentation for an individual stock. Their findings also supported the view that market fragmentation led to better
market efficiency, despite the fact that it may induce short-term volatility. Moreover, a fragmented market is able to
generate higher execution speed in conjunction with lower execution costs.
2.2 What is the impact ofMiFID and the contribution ofMTFs to price discovery?
There are a number of empirical studies that analysed and explained whether the market segmentation and competi-
tion manifested in the proliferation of MTFs may improve market quality—in particular, the discovery of prices during
different stages of MiFID. Riordan et al. (2011) employed the Hasbrouck information share method to investigate the
contribution of several alternative trading facilities to price discovery in the UK equity market. The mean of the esti-
mated upper and lower bounds of information share for each of the trading venues is used to indicate the percentage
of contributions to price discovery from a respective trading venue. During the period of April and May 2010, Chi-X
and LSE are found in the leading position, with Chi-X contributing 44.6%of the total price discovery, and LSE unexpect-
edly 10% lower than Chi-X with 34.6%, which contradicts the common view that a regulated market is in a dominant
position relative to MTFs in the price discovery processes. More interestingly, Riordan et al. (2011) revealed that the
prices from Chi-X move ahead of other markets, and thus Chi-X is the most efficient market. In addition, BATS con-
tributes 12.9% to the total price discovery with 7.8% from Turquoise. Further, the prices from Turquoise contain stale
information, and this can be exploited by arbitrageurs.
Aitken et al. (2010) compared the price formation process before and after the implementation of MiFID for four
leading British equities listed on LSE andChi-X. The study employed both theHasbrouck (1995) information share and
Gonzalo and Granger (1995) common factor weight to measure price discovery. Similar to Riordan et al. (2011), the
study suggested that there was a significant shift of price discovery for the leading British stocks from LSE to MTFs.
In this study, Chi-X again led price discovery. The shift was caused by changes in the fee schedules, rather than the
implementation of MiFID or MiFID's new trading rules. In other words, the transition was due to the reduction in the
trading execution fees and low latency services provided by Chi-X.
Gentile and Fioravanti (2011) also evaluated the impact of fragmented trading environment on price discovery.
Their sample included 50 equities from the Stoxx Europe and 50 indices for the study period from September 2010 to
February 2011. It is interesting to see that in some cases, traditional primary equity exchanges lost their leading posi-
tion in the price discovery processes. In particular, in 32% of the chances Chi-X was the leading venue, and in 46% of
the chances, primary exchanges took the lead. Also, 88%of the stock trading, whereChi-X took the lead, were stamped
as highly fragmented, and 83% of the stock trading, where primary venues led, were classified as having low levels of
fragmentation.
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Aitken,Harris, andDiMarco (2012) examined the competitiondynamics after the implementationofMiFIDbyusing
the CAC40 constituents. The analysis was undertaken across the various trading venues—NYSE Euronext Paris, Chi-X
andBATS. The results showed that the primary venueNYSEEuronext Paris dominated themarketwithmore than 90%
of permanent information impounding. Chi-X, however, was only responsible for about 10% of information flow, and
BATS accounted for very little with respect to permanent information impounding. It was not possible to discern any
effect for these MTFs during the study period in early 2010. However, the information share accounted for by Chi-X
increased over 2009 and 2010, especially for those stocks within CAC 40 constituents, which had the largest market
capitalisation. This suggests that the competition for order flows among the trading venues is concentrated on those
largest stocks. Furthermore, traders in alternative trading venues were found to have high price discovery efficiency
with the aid of their technologically advanced trading models, despite these participants being unlikely to be the first
to impound information.
Spankowski et al. (2012) studied the intra-day patterns for 69 blue chip stocks from FTSE 100 constituents over
the period of January and December 2009. These stocks were traded on LSE (primary market) and on Chi-X, BATS
and Turquoise (alternative venues). The study revealed that trading was mostly concentrated in the primary market
(LSE) during the opening and closing periods of the day, while the volumes of trade in alternative venues only surged
during the second half of the day. This may suggest that traders are mostly dependent on the traditional market with
regard to the price formation process, particularly avoiding high volatility/uncertainty involved in alternative trad-
ing venues during early periods of the day, but then shift back to alternative trading venues in the second half of
the day.
Using Hasbrouck's (1995) information share and Gonzalo and Granger's (1995) common factor weight approach
to assess price discovery across the primary and MTFs markets, Aitken et al. (2010)) argued that during the period
from July 2007 to December 2008, when the MiFID was just launched and trading in MTFs was relatively less active,
there was no evidence of shifting in price discovery from LSE to MTFs due to MiFID. They also believed that the cut
in the MTFs trading fees effectively induced trade in MTFs. Riordan et al. (2011) found that Chi-X and LSE were the
leading force in price discovery, ahead of BATS and Turquoise, on the basis of their analysis from April to May 2010.
Spankowski et al. (2012) found that the volumes of trade shifted across primary and MTFs during intra-day; however,
they tended to concentrate in LSE during the information-intensive period. O'Hara and Ye (2011) studied the US
markets on the impact of MiFID on market quality. They argued that fragmentation and competition did not harm
market quality. Our study employs more recent data to investigate the price discovery processes among primary and
MTFs, in comparison to aforementioned studies which generally investigated the period during MiFID when changes
due to the implementation of MiFID were still on the way to work through markets. During this specific target sample
period, we find that trading venues faced intense competition than before, and the price discovery had migrated from
traditional LSE toMTFs.
3 TESTABLE FRAMEWORK
3.1 The Gonzalo and Granger (1995) permanent-transitorymodel
While Hasbrouck's (1995) information share method uses the variance of the common factor innovations to mea-
sure price discovery, such that the contribution by each market to the variance is the information share, Gonzalo
and Granger's (1995) common factor weight method concentrates on an error correction process which impounds
permanent shocks to raise systemdisequilibrium,with the error correction coefficient as the contribution of eachmar-
ket to the common factor. Central to Gonzalo and Granger (1995) is a permanent-transitory decomposition process
from which price discovery may be measured. Such a decomposition process closely follows the Stock and Watson
(1988) common trend representation of Pt, which is:
Pt = Γ1ft + Gt (1)
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where Pt is a vector of I(1) time series of prices (for example, actual transaction prices; bid/offer quotes); Γ1 is the
loadingmatrix, ft is the common factor, andGt is the transitory component that has no permanent effect on Pt. Gonzalo
and Granger (1995) further impose a linear restriction on Pt in order to identify ft, that is:
ft = ΦjPt (2)
where Φj is the coefficient vector which associates the prices with the common factor. Harris, McInish, and Wood
(2002b) and Baillie, Booth, Tse, and Zabotina (2002) suggested that Φj can be normalized such that they pick up the
weights of market j’s contributions to the common factor. The higher the common factor weightΦj, the greater is the
importance of market j ’s contributions to the long-term stochastic trend.11
Gonzalo and Granger (1995) proved thatΦj is orthogonal to the error correction coefficient vector 𝛼 in the Vector
Error Correction representation of Pt, such that 𝛼⊥= Φ′. Additionally, 𝛼⊥ can be found by estimating this Vector Error
Correction representation of Pt via OLS, which is:
ΔPt = 𝛼𝛽′Pt−1 +
∑k
j=1
AjΔPt−j + et (3)
where 𝛼 represents an error correction vector; 𝛽 is the co-integrating vector; et represents a vector of serially uncorre-
lated innovations with zero-mean. The fundamental assumption is that when one security is traded in several markets,
the prices of the security in different markets will not drift too much from each other, and the price differentials are
captured by the error correction term.
Following Johansen (1988), themaximum likelihood estimator of 𝛼⊥ can be found by solving Eq. (4):
12
|||𝜆S00 − S01S−111S10||| = 0 (4)
for the eigenvalues 𝜆 > 𝜆2 … 𝜆n and eigenvectors M̂ (m̂1,…, m̂n). Normalising the eigenvectors such that M̂′S00M̂ = I,
the selection of 𝛼⊥ is given by Eq. (5):
𝛼⊥ = (m̂r+1,… , m̂n) (5)
It is important to note that the selection of 𝛼⊥ is according to the last column of the eigenvector M̂ , and 𝛼⊥ =Φ′.
Following theGonzalo andGranger (1995) permanent-transitorymodel, our testable framework is explained as fol-
lows. We allow the long-run common stochastic factor shared by security prices on different markets to be expressed
as a linear combination of these series where:
ft = Φ1PL + Φ2PB + Φ3PT (6)
and ft is the common factor, and PL, PB and PT are the price series with respect to LSE, BATS trading and Turquoise.
Φj can be seen as the contributions from each trading venue to the common factor ft.
3.2 Huang's (2002) weighted price contributionmethod
The weighted price contribution method uses intra-day price change observation over multiple days to generate the
intra-day breakdown of price discovery of the same financial asset. In finance, the method is often used to reveal price
variation, for the sameasset, takingplace at different periods of the tradingday.Huang (2002) takes the cross-sectional
aspect of the method, which allows the revelation of price change for the same asset, taking place at different trading
venues at different periods of a trading day. In particular, Huang (2002) calculates the relative contribution of the jth
trading venue to the total price change at intra-day time periods for a given financial asset, and thereby themarket (or
price) leadershipmay be tested and compared. Central to Huang (2002) is the aggregatedweighted price contribution
at a given trading hour k, for the jth venue over multiple daysm, that is:
WPCk,j =
m∑
i−1
WPCk,i,j (7)
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where:
WPCk,i,j = ΔPk,i,j(%) ×Wi
ΔPk,i,j(%) =
ΔPk,i,j∑3
j=1
∑k
t=1 ΔPk,i,j
Wi =
|||∑3j=1∑kt=1 ΔPk,i,j||||||∑3j=1∑kt=1 ΔPk,i,j|||Σmi=1
WPCk,i,j is the weighted price contribution from jth trading venue during kth trading hour on ith day; ΔPk , i , j is the
price change of jth trading venue during kth trading hour on ith day, which is calculated as the price difference at two
successive time intervals within ith day;ΔPk , i , j(%) is the percentage of the price change of the jth trading venue during
kth trading hour on ith day where the denominator ofΔPk , i , j(%) shows the sum of total price changes on ith day across
all three trading venues; Wi is the weighting factor of the price changes on ith day
13 where the denominator of Wi
shows the aggregated absolute price changes at all three trading venues across thewhole sample periodm; |ΔPi| is the
absolute value of total price changes across a total of j = 1, 2, 3 venues and m is the number of days included in the
calculation.
As the methodology stands, Eq. (7) allows us to generate intra-day breakdown of price variations at each of j = 1,
2, 3 trading venues. Another salient feature of Huang's (2002) weighted price contribution method is that wemay use
Eq. (8) to reveal daily average price variation at j’s trading venue for a stock over multiple daysm:
WPCj =
m∑
i=1
( ||ΔPi||
Σm
i=1
||ΔPi||
)
×
⎛⎜⎜⎝
|||ΔPi,j|||
Σ3
j=1
|||ΔPi,j|||
⎞⎟⎟⎠ (8)
where:
|ΔPi| is the absolute value of total price changes across a total of j= 1, 2, 3 venues andΔPi , j is the daily price change
at jth trading venue on ith day.
The second term on the right-hand side of Eq. (8) is the relative contribution of jth trading venue to the total price
change on ith day. The first term on the right-hand side of Eq. (5) is the weighting factor, which shows the contribution
of total absolute price change during ith day to the aggregated absolute price change throughout the whole sample
periodm.
In our empirical analyses, the last transaction prices were used in the calculation. Each trading day was classified
into 17 half-hour periods, starting from 8:00 until 16:30 London time. The intra-day weighted price contribution by
each trading venue over the post-MiFID sample years is generated according to Eq. (7). The daily average weighted
price contribution from each trading venue is calculated by Eq. (8).
4 DATA
The data used in this study are intra-day five-minute transaction prices data, obtained from the Thomson Reuters Tick
History Database. Despite the fact that the five-minute prices data show high levels of convergence, the price differ-
ences across those trading venues under our study, although small, are still observable and testable. The one-minute
data obtained from the same data source show high levels of non-synchronized trade and high level of noises (i.e. more
misrecorded and missing data in consecutive observation periods, and more significant outliers than those from the
five-minute data),which requires intensive data filtering and filling techniques to process thedata. Although these data
processing techniques might cause the overall estimations and analyses to become complicated and introduce poten-
tial bias to the results, these improved better quality one-minute / higher frequency data are capable of generating
enriched information and results.
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Ten companies have been selected from the FTSE 100 constituents list that are also traded on BATS Europe and
Turquoise. The ten companies are HSBC, BHP Billiton, Vodafone, Rio Tinto, Barclays, GlaxoSmithKline, AstraZeneca,
Xstrata, Anglo American and TESCO. The sample period extends from January 2010 to October 2013. Thus, standing
at the third year since the commencement of MiFID in 2007, most of the major changes are in place and incorporated
into trading in different venues. Data from MTFs are now free of the problem of infrequent trade, which could have
been the case during the first two years ofMiFID.
Our selection ofMTFs is limited by the availability of data. Both Chi-X and BATS are subsidiaries under BATS Chi-X
Europe. Although Chi-X has highest market share over all MTFs in the UKmarket, and a number of studies did employ
Chi-X data (rather than BATS), the Chi-X order book is unavailable in this study. This unavailability of data is mainly
because MiFID does not force the introduce of central consolidated tap for all market data across different trading
venues. Consequently, the data vendors may not have the full access to market data. TwoMTFs stand out and remain
usable data sources—BATS trading which was the second largest MTF, followed by Turquoise, at fourth place in terms
of market share.14
The continuous trading hours for the London Stock Exchange start from 8:00 to 16:30 in London time, and the time
remains the same for the BATS trading and Turquoise. In order to address the data problem during opening and closing
time periods where high price volatility occurs, as well as to synchronize the data that were offset by the Thomson
Reuters databasewith regards to the British summer time,15 the first and last hours were censored and therefore only
the data from 9:00 to 15:30 were adopted in our analysis. Also, the data that had been mistakenly recorded or missed
were filtered and filled by previous valid data. The data were also split into a few subsets on a yearly basis, so it is more
convenient to generate year-on-year changes and analyses. In addition, in order to avoid the possible correlations in
overnight prices, only the lagged observations within the same day were used in our regression analyses. In doing so, a
number of data points at the beginning of the day with regards to the lagged length were censored.
5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
5.1 Common factor weight results
We use one of the companies under study, Anglo American, to explain how we estimate the Gonzalo and Granger
(1995) common factor weight Φj. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Johansen and Juselius (1990) trace test results
for PL, PB and PT are reported in Tables 2 and 3 (note that the two tables also provide the relevant test results for all
other companies under study). The sample period is from 2010 to 2013. All series (PL, PB and PT ) are found to be I(1);
there are two co-integrating vectors among the three series and hence there is one common stochastic trend shared
by them. Note that the characteristics of sub-sample period data for 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 are highly consistent
with the whole sample results shown in Tables 2 and 3—all prices at the three different venues are I(1) for each year;
and there is one common stochastic trend shared by PL, PB and PT for each year. For simplicity, only the whole sample
results are reported. These empirical results indicate that the prices formed by different trading venues for the same
stock are co-integrated by a long-run underlying informational equilibrium. This shows that the proliferation of MTFs
and the competition between trading venues do not harm the information contained in prices. The trading activities for
a stock in different venues shows a convergence pattern, which is the result of arbitrage. It, in turn, suggests thatMTFs
are able to incorporate and disseminate price information to facilitate price discovery.
Then, we use the Akaike Information Criterion to determine the optimal lag length for an unrestricted VAR
formed of PL, PB and PT. The optimal lag length is estimated as 2. Given this, the co-integrating structure for Anglo
American represented by a VECM with 2 lags is estimated using the maximum likelihood estimation method (see
Table 4). The matrix 𝛼⊥ assigned for the Gonzalo and Granger (1995) common factor weight Φj is selected from
the last column of the eigenvector M̂, which is 𝛼⊥(1.080, 1.029, 0.640)
′. The common factor comprising of Φj for
each trading venue is identified as f = 1.080PL+1.029PB+0.640PT. These weights are indicative of the importance
of respective venue's contribution to the common factor—the higher the weight, the greater the contribution for that
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TABLE 3 Johansen and Juselius (1990) trace test for co-integrating rank of the long-run 𝜋matrix
Table 3 consolidates the results of the Johansen and Juselius (1990) trace test after assessing the co-integrating rank
of the long-run 𝝅matrix. The results confirm that the prices of the same company's equity traded under LSE, BATS, and
turquoise are co-integrated with at least two co-integrating vectors, and hence there is one common stochastic trend
shared by these price series
Anglo American AstraZeneca
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) 𝜸trace 𝜸max Hypothesized No. of CE(s) 𝜸trace 𝜸max
r= 0 5177.51* 3031.20* r= 0 8965.52* 5914.39*
r= 1 2146.31* 2139.59* r= 1 3051.13* 3041.36*
r= 2 6.71 6.71 r= 2 9.77 9.77
Barclays BHP Billiton
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) 𝜸trace 𝜸max Hypothesized No. of CE(s) 𝜸trace 𝜸max
r= 0 18374.81* 10747.24* r= 0 11579.43* 7689.03*
r= 1 7627.57* 7624.13* r= 1 3890.40* 3880.59*
r= 2 3.44 3.44 r= 2 9.81 9.81
GlaxoSmithKline HSBC
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) 𝜸trace 𝜸max Hypothesized No. of CE(s) 𝜸trace 𝜸max
r= 0 14811.95* 8106.79* r= 0 18766.80* 10903.26*
r= 1 6705.16* 6690.42* r= 1 7863.54* 7858.52*
r= 2 14.74* 14.74* r= 2 5.03 5.03
Rio Tinto TESCO
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) 𝜸trace 𝜸max Hypothesized No. of CE(s) 𝜸trace 𝜸max
r= 0 17133.52* 9312.23* r= 0 5629.97* 3993.23*
r= 1 7821.29* 7812.28* r= 1 1636.74* 1630.96*
r= 2 9.01 9.01 r= 2 5.78 5.78
Vodafone Xstrata
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) 𝜸trace 𝜸max Hypothesized No. of CE(s) 𝜸trace 𝜸max
r= 0 8888.89* 6677.65* r= 0 13335.17* 8994.33*
r= 1 2211.24* 2202.36* r= 1 4340.83* 4334.28*
r= 2 8.89 8.89 r= 2 6.55 6.55
Notes: 1. Statistical significance at the 95% level or greater is signified by *. 2. We perform the Johansen and Juselius (1990)
Trace Test to assess the co-integrating rank of the long-run 𝝅matrix. The results confirm that the prices of the same company's
equity traded under LSE, BATS, and Turquoise are co-integrated with at least two co-integrating vectors, and hence there is
one common stochastic trend shared by these price series.
trading venue to the common factor, and the closer is the co-movement between that trading venue and the long-
term common stochastic trend (Chu, Hsieh, & Tse, 1999). The venue with the highest weight is considered as the
dominant market, which in turn is the common factor leading other markets in the price discovery processes. In
order to make a more a sensible comparison of the price leadership, the estimated common factor weight may be
interpreted in percentages (Booth et. al 1999). Thus, in the case of Anglo American in 2010, each of the weighting
coefficients (1.080, 1.029, 0.640) may be divided by the sum of these coefficients, which is 2.749. The results are
then transformed into percentages, which are 39%, 37% and 24%, implying that all three markets do contribute to
price discovery, with LSE having the highest contribution to the common factor, followed by BATS and Turquoise,
respectively.
In conjunction with the above example based on Anglo American for 2010, we now generate the relevant Gonzalo
and Granger (1995) common factor weight for all other companies for all four years under our study (see Table 5). At
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TABLE 4 The Estimated Gonzalo and Granger (1995) common factor weight
Table4 reports the co-integrating structure for angloAmerican is estimated in the tablebelow.Themaximum likelihood
estimation is applied on the VECM representation of the data with an optimum lag length of two, which is determined
by the akaike information criterion, given amaximum of eight lags were selected and tested in the study
Eigenvalues 𝝀
0.246 0.099 0.000
Eigenvectors v̂
PL 7.110 6.866 −0.005
PB −16.891 −0.730 0.029
PT 9.784 −6.135 0.052
Eigenvectors M̂
PL 4.716 7.313 1.080
PB −11.555 −0.982 1.029
PT 6.933 −6.618 0.640
Note: 1. The cointegrating structure for Anglo American is estimated as follows. Themaximum likelihood estimation is applied
on the VECM representation of the data with an optimum lag length of two, determined by the Akaike Information Criterion,
given a maximum of eight lags were selected and tested in the study. 2. The matrix 𝛼⊥ assigned for the common factor weight
Φj is selected from the last column of the eigenvector M̂, which is 𝛼⊥=(1.080, 1.029, 0.640)′ . The common factor comprising
of Φj ’s for each trading venue is identified as f = 1.080PL+1.029PB+0.640PT. These weights are indicative of the importance
of respective venue's contribution to the common factor, such that the higher the weight, the greater is the contribution of
that trading venue to the common factor, and the closer is the co-movement between that trading venue and the long-term
common stochastic trend (Chu et al., 1999).
first glance, all trading venues significantly contribute to the informational common long-term factor for the under-
lying asset values. In particular, the results indicate that the LSE lost its dominant position over the years after the
implementation of the MiFID,16 as there is no evidence in support of the view that the common factor weight for the
LSE are significantly higher than the other twomarkets. In nearly all of the cases, the multilateral trading venues make
significantly higher contributions to the common factor than the LSE for the entire post-MiFID periods under study.
For instance, for Anglo American, the LSE contributes 7% and 16% to the common factor in 2011 and 2012, while the
other two markets contribute 33% to 51% to the common factor. Additionally, for AstraZeneca, LSE contributes 3%
while BATS contributes 73% in 2011, implying that the BATS trading becomes the dominant force in price discovery.
There are more cases where MTFs are in the dominant position: Barclays and BHP Billiton in 2010, where BATS con-
tributes 76% and 83%, respectively; GlaxoSmithKline in 2013, where BATS contributes 70% to the common factor
weights; and, HSBC in 2013, where Turquoise contributes 68.3%.
It is interesting to note, however, that Riordan et al. (2011) revealed Chi-X as having the highest contribution to the
price discovery, followed by LSE, with BATS and Turquoise having the lowest contributions. The prices from Turquoise
lag behind other markets and aremore likely to have contained stale information. Our study finds BATS and Turquoise
all leading the price discovery over the LSE.17 These newchanges inmarket share revealed in our analyses indicate that
MTFs have gained success over LSE, which may be relevant to the low latency and low costs trading that they offered.
With the proliferation of algorithmic trade in recent years, the technology advantages and low latency trading system
have become the driving forces for high frequency traders as well as informed traders. Although these questions have
not been explored in detail in this study, a comparison on the impacts of both trading speed and trading costs on price
discovery from post-MiFIDMTFsmay be explored by some future research.
5.2 Weighted price contribution results
The results in Table 6 show that the estimated weighted price contributions from the multilateral trading venues are
slightly higher than the LSE on a daily basis. The daily average price contributions from BATS and Turquoise are about
34% for each MTF in each post-MiFID year, while those from the LSE are about 32% in each year. In particular, BATS
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TABLE 5 The estimated Gonzalo and Granger (1995) common factor weight for all 10 companies during the Post-
MiFID period
Table 5 displays the estimatedGonzalo andGranger (1995) common factorweight in percentage terms tomake amore
sensible comparison of the price leadership (Booth, So & Tse, 1999)
Anglo American 2010 2011 2012 2013 AstraZeneca 2010 2011 2012 2013
LSE 39% 7%* 16%* 42% LSE 26% 3%* 15%* 35%
BATS 37% 47% 51% 4%* BATS 56% 73% 48% 35%
TURQ 24%* 46% 33% 54% TURQ 18%* 24% 37% 30%*
Barclays 2010 2011 2012 2013 BHPBilliton 2010 2011 2012 2013
LSE 6%* 0.40%* 24% 3%* LSE 8%* 12%* 11%* 3%*
BATS 76% 59% 14%* 30% BATS 83% 51% 31% 31%
TURQ 18% 40.60% 62% 67% TURQ 9% 37% 58% 66%
GlaxoSmithKline 2010 2011 2012 2013 HSBC 2010 2011 2012 2013
LSE 14%* 14%* 12%* 2%* LSE 14%* 28% 7%* 0.70%*
BATS 66% 26% 47% 70% BATS 66% 70% 47% 31%
TURQ 20% 60% 41% 28% TURQ 19% 2%* 46% 68.30%
Rio Tinto 2010 2011 2012 2013 TESCO 2010 2011 2012 2013
LSE 17%* 2%* 4%* 11%* LSE 26% 19%* 5%* 22%*
BATS 50% 44% 36% 29% BATS 52% 27% 17% 34%
TURQ 33% 54% 60% 60% TURQ 22%* 54% 78% 44%
Vodafone 2010 2011 2012 2013 Xstrata 2010 2011 2012 2013
LSE 8%* 4%* 3%* 0.30%* LSE 4%* 0.50%* 9%* 37%
BATS 78% 67% 51% 50% BATS 52% 10% 15% 26%*
TURQ 14% 29% 46% 49.70% TURQ 44% 89.50% 76% 37%
Notes: 1. The estimated Gonzalo and Granger (1995) common factor weight were reported in percentage terms to make a
more sensible comparison of the price leadership (Booth et al., 1999). 2. *signifies the casewhere the estimated common factor
weight is the smallest among the three equivalent estimates in the same year. In the majority of the cases, the common factor
weight for LSEwere small relative to those for BATS or Turquoise, indicating that the relative importance of the trading venue
LSE in the overall financial markets becameminor afterMiFID.
trading has the highest price contribution during 2010 and 2012, while Turquoise has the highest contribution in 2011
and 2013. These results indicate that the multilateral trading venues take a slight lead in terms of price discovery over
the LSE, which is consistent with Aitken et al. (2010) and Riordan et al. (2011) as well as our findings from the common
factor weight method (see Section 5.1).
The estimated average price contributions from each trading venue at intra-day levels shows a U-shape pattern
similar to the findings of Blau, Van Ness, and Van Ness (2009) and Vanthuan and Chanwit (2009). In other words, the
contribution to daily total price movement at each intra-day period is mostly high during the first half-hour of the day,
and gradually declines through the day. However, it increases slightly in the afternoon from 14:30 to 15:00. In partic-
ular, the price contribution within the first half-hour ranges from 5% to 8% across years, and declines to about 2% in
other trading intervals, with an exception during 14:30 to 15:00 where the price contributes about 3%–4% to daily
pricemovement across years.
It is interesting to see that, with the exception of 2011, both BATS and Turquoise yield higher price contributions
than LSE in 2010, 2012 and 2013, especially during the first half-hour of the day. In 2010, BATS has the highest contri-
bution among the three venues, which is 5.82%, and LSE has the lowest contribution at 5.41%. During 2012, BATS and
Turquoise both contribute 5.88%during the first period of the day, while the LSE contributes 5.56%. In 2013, BATS and
Turquoise contribute 7.98% and 7.95% respectively, while the LSE contributes 7.81%. LSE gradually gained back price
contribution over 2013.
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It is also worth noticing that in the last period of the day, the price contribution from LSE is generally very low in
comparison with the twoMTFs. From 2010 to 2013, price contributions from LSE are between 0.05% to 0.31%, while
the price contributions fromBATS and Turquoise are between 1.4% to 2%.
5.3 The U-shape pattern of intra-day trading activities
The U-shape pattern observed from intra-day price variations is widely documented in the literature. Early studies
such as Stoll and Whaley (1990) and Brock and Kleidon (1992) suggested that demand for transactions is higher in
the opening period than in any other periods during a day. Market makers are therefore able to take advantage of the
inelasticity of demand and post wider spread quotes for transactions at such a peak trading hour of the day. When
informed traders execute orders on their privileged information during this time period of the day, price discovery is
facilitated. Admati and Pfeiderer (1988) and Barclay andWarner (1993) also argued that the informed traders prefer
opening period of the day for trade due to the concentration of trading volume, such that the informed traders could
camouflage their information during this period. Stoll and Whaley (1990) suggested that the discovery process can
be better facilitated by greater transparency, and this view is supported by Boehmer, Saar, and Yu (2005), who found
evidence that greater pre-trade transparency can improve price efficiency and induce better price discovery. Huang
(2002) andTheissen (2002) pointed out that themultilateral trading venues have the advantage of faster trading speed
which could attract informed traders and facilitate price efficiency and improve transparency.
Such an argument may well explain higher price contributions of BATS and Turquoise (than LSE) at the opening
period of the day as the multilateral trading venues are able to disseminate price information faster than LSE. In addi-
tion, the price contributions of the multilateral trading venues at the end of a trading day are also found to be much
higher than those of LSE, which reinforces the view thatMTFs lead price discovery. The trading stoppages hypothesis,
which is supported by Cyree and Winters (2001), stated that the moving of prices away from the optimal position at
the end of a day is the result of arriving overnight information, and the price movement at the end of a day is in need
of initiation of opening trade for the following trading day. The greater price movements of BATS and Turquoise at the
end of a daymay be an indication of informed traders’ preference of venues for price discovery.
6 CONCLUSIONS
Back to year 2000 at the FinancialMarkets Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Chairman of the Board
of Governors Alan Greenspan mentioned that “concern that this fragmentation (of order flow) will harm the price
discovery process, investors’ ability to obtain the best executions, and overall market liquidity are driving many pol-
icy questions.” (see also Tse, Bandyopadhyay, & Shen, 2006.) Seven years later, however, a European Law on financial
services which promotes multi-market trading of similar underlying assets has been passed. The Markets in Finan-
cial Instruments Directive (MiFID), the cornerstone of the pan-Europe regulatory framework, came into force on 1st
November 2007. It aims to build a more harmonised European financial market through the removal of the “concen-
tration rule’. Consequently, MiFID has caused a proliferation of Multilateral Trading Facilities (MTFs) and increased
competition across different trading venues. Is the gain in the market share for MTFs beneficial for market quality?
Our paper examines the questions as to whether the dominant position of traditional primary markets is challenged
by the competition, and whether MTFs contribute to price discovery in financial markets. In particular, we analysed
and explained whether MTFs are able to disseminate and incorporate price information, as well as whether the prices
for the same security at different trading venues reflect the common information for the underlying asset value. Our
research findings are summarised as follows:
1. In line with the CESR 2009 reports, the declining trend in the average order size is observed throughout the years
afterMiFID. It is also interesting to note that the number of trades ismuch higher in the post-MiFID period than the
pre-MiFID period. This could be due to a combined effect from the proliferation of high frequency trading and the
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transparency waiver with MiFID. More specifically, there is a large-in-scale waiver for pre- and post-trade trans-
parency, and the large-in-scale threshold is determined by the average order size. Therefore, investors could have
incentives to reduce order size and exploit the benefit from these transparency waivers.
2. Theprices formedbydifferent trading venues for the same stock are co-integratedwith a long-rununderlying infor-
mational equilibrium. This indicates that the proliferation ofMTFs and the competition between trading venues do
not harm the information contained in prices. The trading activities for a stock in different venues show a conver-
gence pattern, which is the result of arbitrage. This, in turn, suggests thatMTFs are able to incorporate and dissem-
inate price information to facilitate price discovery.
3. The result based on the Gonzalo and Granger (1995) common factor weight approach suggests that all trading
venues, especially BATS and Turquoise, significantly contribute to the informational common long-term factor for
the underlying asset value.
4. Unlike Riordan et al. (2011), where Turquoise is found lagging behind other MTFs and is more likely to have con-
tained stale information, our paper shows that Turquoise leads price discovery over LSE. These new changes in the
market share revealed in our analyses indicate that MTFs have gained some success over LSE, which may be rele-
vant to low latency and low-cost trading that they offer. However, due to data constraints, the relationship between
low latency, low-cost trading and the preference of informed traders cannot be tested in this study.
5. The results based on Huang's (2002) weighted price contribution method suggests that intra-day price contribu-
tions of MTFs are higher than those of LSE, especially during the first and last periods of the day. The estimated
average daily price contributions are consistent with this result.
ENDNOTES
1 The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) replaced its predecessor, the Investment Services Directive (ISD)
and came into force on the 1st of November in 2007. It aims to promote a harmonized European financial market through a
pan-Europe regulatory framework for more efficient supervisions, as well as cultivating competition among trading venues
to foster a fair gamemarket.
2 The first pan-European equities exchange Chi-X Europe was launched in 2007, followed by BATS Europe in the subsequent
year. In February2011,BATSGlobalMarkets agreedon thepurchaseofChi-XEurope for $300million. Thedealwas referred
to the Competition Commission by theOffice of Fair Trading to investigate further whether substantial lessening of compe-
titionwas possible resultant from the anticipatedmerger in June 2011. However, the Commission approved the transaction
in late November 2011, which caused BATS to close the deal on 30th November 2011.
3 The LIT order book refers to transparent limited order books that are operated by RMs (Regulated Markets) and MTFs,
which is the opposite of the “Dark” order book.
4 See, for example, Pagano (1989), Chowdhry and Nanda (1991), Madhavan (1995), Bennett and Wei (2006), and Gajewski
and Gresse (2007).
5 See, for example, Harris (1993), Economides (1996), Hendershott and Mendelson (2000), Boehmer and Boehmer (2003),
Foucault andMenkveld (2008), andO'Hara and Ye (2011).
6 It is also interesting to note that the trading volume for FTSE 100 declined dramatically from £240 billion in 2009 to
£172 billion in 2016, which could be the consequence of growth in OTC and dark pools trading revealed in Table 1, Panel (a).
7 An example of suchMTFs that compete with the incumbent exchanges is the Nordic trading facility Burgundy.
8 The actions available for traditional RMs to counter those competitive pressure includemergers and acquisitions to expand
their business regimes.
9 Due to data restrictions, our study uses ten FTSE 100 constituents that are also traded actively onMTFs.
10 In contrast, Chowdry andNanda (1991) suggested fragmentation could lead to an increase in adverse selection risk because
of asymmetric information and a “cream skimming” effect.
11 The empirical applications of the common factor weight method can be found in Booth, So, and Tse (1999), Chu, Hsieh, and
Tse (1999), andHarris, McInish, andWood (2002a).
12 Si,j = T−1
∑T
t=1 RitR
′
jt
, i, j = 0,1. It captures the residuals R from regressingΔPt and on (ΔPt−1 ,… ,ΔPt−q+1), respectively.
13 This weighting factor helps control any potential problems caused by heteroscedasticity, as addressed by Barclay and
Hendershott (2008), Barclay andWarner (1993), and Vanthuan and Chanwit (2009).
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14 According to the records fromBATS Chi-X Europe.
15 For example—when it is actually 16:30 London time, but the database recorded the price with time stamp 15:30 after off-
setting the British summer time. Therefore, the prices between 15:30 and 16:30 in the database are actually from closing
auction and after market reports, rather than from continuous trading. Similar issues arise for the pre-opening sessions.
16 This is similar to the findings in Aitken, Harris, and Sensenbrenner (2010)) and Riordan, Storkenmaier, andWagener (2011).
17 Data fromChi-X is unavailable in our study.
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